the belief that violence or armed conflict over water will eventually occur. This perception is no more strongly held than in one of the planet's most severely waterstressed regions -the Jordan River basin in the Middle East. This essay strives to address the fundamental issue of how fresh water could be the cause of violence or armed conflict in the western Middle East. It examines a number of the more significant areas where water is a recognized challenge between the populations and governments of that part of the world and suggests the relative significance that water plays as a determinant of conflict in each of those areas. In the end, it affirms the widely held belief that water has an important role in conflict generation, while at the same time, it suggests that in some areas where water-related issues exist, other determinants are present that relegate water to a secondary factor of potential conflict.
THE JORDAN RIVER: SOURCE OF LIFE AND SOURCE OF CONFLICT
Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over.
-Samuel Langhorne Clemens 1 It is an unfortunate reality that the world is currently facing a global fresh water crisis -one which many believe will eventually lead to violence or armed conflict. While there are some who think that this is a crisis of scarcity (certainly the physical availability of water is a grave concern in some locations), the issue of a global water shortage is, at best, debatable.
2
Consider for a moment that water is a basic element of human survival, that human beings require a minimum of 20 liters per day to meet their most basic needs.
What very few would argue, however, is that water is not in the right place in the right quantity; that there is a disparity between those who have ready access to it and those who do not. With predicted near-term population growth as it is, all indications are that this diverging trend will continue in the coming years and that the fresh water resources of the globe will continue to be a source of stress for many people. 3 With that in mind, at present, almost 900 million people worldwide, or just less than one in eight, lack access to safe and clean water supplies. 4 Emphasizing the fact that water which many consume or otherwise use is not suitable for such use, statistics show that over 3.5 million people die each year from water-related diseases. Unlike wars and natural disasters, this water crisis does not make media headlines. Nor does it galvanize concerted international action. Yet, as these statistics suggest, the challenges of equitable availability coupled with transboundary issues make it a truly serious and complex one. This is no more evident than in the Middle East, arguably the world's most severely water-stressed region, where more than 90 percent of usable water crosses international boundaries.
it is easy to conclude that water is more than just a localized issue for some parts of the world.
9
Few regions of the world offer a more varied physical geography or a richer mix of ethnicities, religions, languages, societies, cultures and politics than the Middle East.
At the same time, no segment of the globe presents its diverse aspects in such a mixture of conflicts and complexities. From this, one issue emerges as the most conspicuous, cross-cutting and problematic -fresh water. Its scarcity and rapid diminution happen to occur in some of the driest parts of an area where there are also some of the fiercest national animosities. Water in the Middle East is thus a conflict- Through the course of the presentation, it will affirm the opinion of many that water, indeed, can be a factor in the outbreak of violence in this region. But, at the same time, it should also become clear that if conflict does erupt, water will likely not be the only cause that leads to that conflict.
In order to begin to understand this complex situation, a more detailed description of the Jordan River system itself is necessary. As shown in Figure 1 new fears that those projects to divert the Litani waters southward would now be put into practice. 21 Lebanese newspapers and politicians repeatedly accused Israel of working on a diversion scheme or even having already begun to extract water. 22 These accusations have always been rejected by Israel. Past interest in the Litani is acknowledged, but present occupation of the "South Lebanese Security Zone" is claimed to be related only to national security issues alone. The best evidence indicates that there have been no
Israeli withdrawals from the Litani River to date, except for supply of stationed troops, nor construction of infrastructure to support such a withdrawal 23 On the other hand, the idea of increasing Israel's water supply by importing water from the Litani has not been permanently archived. Into the 1990s, several Israeli experts (e.g. Kally and Fishelson) . Moreover, the flow of the Litani has been diminishing in its lower course in the last decades due to Lebanese diversions upstream, both for irrigation and power generation. The remaining usable flow amounts to no more than 125 million cubic meters (mcm), thus likely diminishing Israeli interest in a great diversion scheme. 24 Therefore, the issue of the Litani has not yet been put to rest permanently and remains as a potential source of future conflict. Further, given the absence of any other major source of contention, it seems fair to conclude that if conflict does occur, water is likely to be a leading cause. The risk of that happening, however, appears relatively low as it seems unlikely that Israel would attempt a unilateral diversion of the Litani without an explicit agreement.
continued to propose diverting the remaining Litani waters to the south as a means of alleviating water scarcity in Israel. This issue is related to water since the areas in question cross the Jordan River in one section and represent parts of the shores of Lake Tiberias in another. By extending its sovereignty over the formerly demilitarized zones, Syria could demand part of the water rights to the lake and/or obstruct Israeli diversions.
Thus, the struggle over the headwaters of the Jordan River cannot be solely regarded as a genuine water conflict. Rather, water disputes must be regarded as part of the overall security dilemma in this part of the Middle East. But, as long as the political differences and the climate of mistrust between the parties persist, water will not only be considered a source of conflict, but will also be perceived as a potential weapon. In turn, territorial claims resulting from that perception complicate the situation and make it difficult to conclude that water would be the primary source.
Further downstream, just south of Lake Tiberias, another source of potential conflict centers around the Yarmuk River, the largest tributary of the Jordan. 38 Though, as a result of the "Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" of October 26, 1994, the impact of water on the potential for conflict between those two countries has been greatly reduced. In that agreement, Israel's annual share of the Yarmuk's waters was fixed at 25 mcm (plus 20 mcm which it is allowed to pump into Lake Tiberias in the winter, but has to return to Jordan in the summer) and entitled Jordan to the rest of the flow. 39 As a result, Israel accepted a consistent reduction compared to its 70 mcm Yarmuk River annual average consumption rate of the previous two decades. Similarly, that treaty granted Jordan the right to use a minimum amount of 30 mcm from the Jordan River. 40 Israel's share of the same was not stated, presumably leaving it to continue to consume its average pretreaty amount of some 550 mcm. 41 However, it is important to note that historically this has not always been the case. Therefore, the potential exists then that the calm of the present day could degenerate to less cordial conditions, if stipulations of the peace treaty are not followed.
Additionally, there are the actions of a wild card factor in this equation, Syria, that must be considered, as well.
With that, Jordan realized an infinitesimal increase in its use of water from the Jordan River, which until that time was virtually nothing. In the West Bank, Palestinians are only allowed to drill shallow wells of 60 to 140 meters, while, Mekorot, the contractor of Israel's water authority supplying the Jewish settlers, prefers to drill to depths of 300 to 400 meters, where higher flow rates and better quality water are found. 51 In addition, reforestation is prohibited in the recharge area of the aquifers, except on private plots, in order to promote maximum run-off and thus recharging of the aquifers.
These deeper wells exacerbate the problem in that they tend to draw down the water tables that feed the shallower Palestinian wells, causing them to be drawn down to exhaustion. , it is hard to find exact agreeable figures to corroborate this statement. However, all agree that there is a high imbalance between prices paid by the settlers and those demanded of their Palestinian neighbors. 56 Since the Gaza aquifer is in part recharged by water inflows from the adjacent Israeli territory, replenishment depends on Israeli behavior. Palestinians claim that, due to ground water extraction by Israeli wells near the border and construction of low dams upstream in Wadi Gaza, Israel is diminishing the natural recharge of the aquifer. 57 They also often point out this apparent contradiction between Israel's insistence on its downstream riparian rights to the West Bank ground waters on one hand and its practice of making the best use of its upstream position in the case of the Gaza aquifer on the other.
In summary, the situation involving the Israelis and Palestinians is obvious complex. Much like the situation further north between Syria and Israel, the tension here is not just about water. Without delving in to the extreme complexities associated with the politics of this situation, suffice it to say that the fact that Israel is generally considered to be a recognized state and Palestine is struggling for a true identify and recognition on the world stage is really the overarching theme here and is the foundation on which the tension dwells. As such, it appears that these political differences create a setting where low-end violence that will eventually escalate into armed conflict is most likely to result. Although water-related issues are unlikely to be the primary factor, they will likely exacerbate the tension and disputes over those other issues.
Finally, furthest downstream, the ground water resources of the Arava Valley (also known as Wadi Araba) extending from south of the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba on both sides of the Israeli-Jordanian border are of some relevance and worth mentioning. This area is very arid, with annual precipitation less than 50 millimeters.
The only water available can be found in subterranean basins, some of which are common to Israel and Jordan. Both countries have been implementing a variety of agricultural schemes on their respective sides of the border. Since there has been no coordination of activities, pumping was competitive, resulting in rapid depletion of the supplies and their increasing salinization. 58 The water-sharing dispute is in part related to territorial controversies concerning some small plots of land which Israel conquered in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Israeli farmers have been cultivating the land and using the wells located on it. However, the water amounts in question are limited. So far, Israel and Jordan seem to have been utilizing eight and four mcm respectively from these sources. Thus, neither party perceives these supplies to be nearly as significant as the waters from the Jordan-Yarmuk system. So here again, in this very southern part of the region, much like the issue of the Yarmuk to the north, water concerns are present as a single source of potential conflict, yet do not present a very high probability of that occurring.
In conclusion, the purpose of this essay was to address the fundamental issue of how water could be a cause of violence or armed conflict in the western Middle East.
This research project provides a basic overview of six of the more significant areas where water is a recognized challenge. This short examination met the stated purpose, demonstrating that water plays a role in the possibility of conflict, significant in some cases and less so in others, in that region of the world. Of the six general areas included in this examination, water could be the primary determinant of conflict in four of them -the Litani River region, the Hasbani River region, the Yarmuk River region and the Arava Valley region. Interestingly, though, the information presented suggests that the likelihood of conflict occurring is relatively low in each of those areas. On the other hand, of the two areas where water would likely play a lesser role if conflict were to occur -the Jordan headwaters region, and the West Bank and Gaza aquifer regions, the probability of such conflict is far greater. While it was not the purpose of this paper to suggest the most likely location, time or parties of such violence or armed conflict, 15 Used here, "Resources" represents internal renewable water resources (IRWR). As defined by the 2007 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Land and Water Development Division, IRWR is comprised of the average annual flow of rivers and recharge of ground water (aquifers) generated from endogenous (internal) precipitation. Natural incoming flows originating outside a country's borders are not included in the total. Even though IRWR measures a combination of surface and ground water resources, it is typically less than the sum of the two because of overlap--water resources that are counted with both surface and ground water. IRWR is calculated as follows: IRWR = surface water resources + ground water resources -overlap. It is measured in cubic meters per person (m 3 /person). http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/regions/neast/index3.stm (accessed January 8, 2010). Also, used here, Withdrawal Rate represents fresh water withdrawal which is the annual quantity of water in cubic meters per person (m
